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BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS MEANING FOR ANTITRUST 
AGENCY DECISION MAKING
James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic1
INTRODUCTION
Of all fields of regulation in the United States, antitrust law relies most 
heavily on economics to inform the design and application of legal rules.2
When drafting antitrust statutes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
Congress anticipated that courts and enforcement agencies would formulate 
and adjust operational standards to account for new learning.3  The field of 
economics—especially industrial organization economics—would give 
broad statutory commands much of their analytical content.4
In principle, the flexibility of U.S. antitrust statutes makes competition 
policy adaptable and accommodates for upgrades over time.5  This evolu-
tionary process is only effective if antitrust institutions can identify signifi-
cant advances in economic learning and refine enforcement policy and doc-
trine accordingly.  Owing to their expertise in economics and law, the two 
federal antitrust agencies—the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—are crucial instru-
ments of adaption.6  The antitrust system’s quality depends on the agencies’ 
1
 Cooper: Law & Economics Center, George Mason University School of Law.  Kovacic: George 
Washington University Law School.  This article is adapted in part from James C. Cooper & William E. 
Kovacic, Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory Behavior, 41 J. REG. ECON. 41 (2012).  
The authors thank Angela Diveley for superb research assistance. 
2
 On this characteristic of the U.S. antitrust system, see generally William E. Kovacic, The Influ-
ence of Economics on Antitrust Law, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 294 (1992); William E. Kovacic & Carl 
Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000). 
3
 This is most evident in the adoption of the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 and the 
establishment of an administrative agency, the Federal Trade Commission, to enforce the statute’s 
prohibition against “unfair methods of competition.”  Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 
Stat. 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006)).  On rationale for the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and the design of the FTC, see Marc Winerman, The Origins of the Federal Trade 
Commission: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003).   
4
 See Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1 (2003). 
5
 The operative terms of the U.S. antitrust statutes are relatively open-ended, and the legislative 
texts do not define them.  For example, Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it an offense—indeed, a 
criminal transgression—to “monopolize” commerce.  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
6
 On the formative role of the two U.S. federal antitrust agencies in shaping norms of business 
behavior, see DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 27-48 
(2011). 
3
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commitment to reassess existing doctrine and policy in light of new devel-
opments. 
The emergence of the field known as behavioral economics (BE) pro-
vides the most recent occasion to examine how the antitrust agencies per-
form this adaptive function.7  Modern BE scholarship examines the implica-
tions for decision making when actors suffer from documented psychologi-
cal biases,8  BE replacing the assumption of rationality with one of “bound-
ed rationality.”  Under this theory, consumers’ actions are affected by their 
initial endowments, tastes for fairness, inability to appreciate future costs, 
lack of self-control, and general use of flawed heuristics. 
The notion that human behavior reflects the influence of varied emo-
tional and psychological impulses is neither novel nor surprising.  Modern 
BE literature does not displace the knowledge gained from earlier applica-
tions of psychology to the study of consumer behavior.  Instead, it builds 
upon and extends insights from earlier work, often by using newer analyti-
cal techniques, including methods developed in the field of experimental 
economics.  Modern BE literature also engages in a more systematic con-
sideration of how departures from traditional assumptions about bounded 
rationality should affect public policy. 
One question posed by BE researchers is whether antitrust agencies 
should alter enforcement policy to incorporate perspectives that depart from 
the rationality assumption.  BE has influenced a new body of antitrust 
scholarship that prescribes greater skepticism of claims that market entry 
ordinarily is an effective means for correcting anticompetitive markets, that 
cartels are inherently unstable, that bundling typically yields net efficien-
cies, and that limits on intra-brand price competition promote inter-brand 
competition in non-price dimensions.9  These views have inspired an active 
debate about future antitrust policy.  The BE-oriented antitrust literature has 
elicited counterarguments from a number of scholars who doubt that BE 
7
 For example, the application of BE to antitrust law is a focal point of modern policy analysis 
within the FTC.  See e.g., Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, A Conference on the 
Economics of Drip Pricing (2012) (conference description and agenda), 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/drippricing/index.shtml.  The FTC also has convened proceedings to 
analyze how insights from BE might affect consumer protection policy.  See e.g., Bureau of Economics, 
Federal Trade Commission, A Conference on Behavioral Economics and Consumer Policy (Sept. 2007) 
(conference agenda and transcripts), http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/docs/agenda.shtml. 
8
 For a collection of essays discussing behavioral economics, see generally THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisis & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).  For a useful 
survey by one of the founders of modern study in this field, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
9
 Prominent examples include, Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economics at the Gate: Antitrust 
in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007); Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: 
Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482 (2002); Avishalom 
Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of Reason After Leegin, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 805. 
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dictates significant changes in existing antitrust analysis or other forms of 
regulatory policy-making.10
The literature we sketch above deals chiefly with the behavior of indi-
vidual consumers and with firms.  In this Article, we focus on a second, 
different set of implications of the BE scholarship for antitrust policy and 
regulation more generally.  We consider how concepts of bounded ration-
ality and other BE insights might improve our understanding of regulatory 
agencies and explain the behavior of individual regulators.  For example, 
what does BE tell us about the likelihood that the DOJ and the FTC will 
make skillful, timely adjustments in policy to account for new learning in 
economics?  Are agencies generally capable of making wise policy choices, 
or do the various behavioral phenomena that affect the decisions of individ-
uals routinely distort the execution of policymaking tasks by public offi-
cials? 
Our work benefits from some important antecedents.  Several BE 
scholars have recognized that BE phenomena can influence regulatory deci-
sions.11  For the most part, these works treat the possibilities for distortion 
in regulatory agency decision making as a second-order problem compared 
to the effect of likely consumer biases.12  There is also substantial literature 
examining the causes of what appears to be irrational behavior by public 
institutions.  This literature generally is not cast in the language of BE, yet 
it explains failed decision making by various government institutions as a 
function of what could be called behavioral tendencies—such as confirma-
tion bias13—that figure prominently in modern BE literature.14
10
 E.g., Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1620 (2006); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Derek W. Moore, The Future of Behavioral Economics in 
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89 (2010); Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law 
and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 470 (2007); Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case 
Against Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517 (2011).
11
 See e.g., Matthew Bennett et al., What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition 
Policy?, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 111 (2010); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
12
 One notable exception is Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and 
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002).  Rachlinski and Farina compare the 
positive and normative implications of both BE and public choice theory for institutional design, with 
specific focus on the interaction between Congress, the executive, courts, and regulators.  Our work 
allows public choice theory and BE to simultaneously shape policy outcomes. 
13
 See infra note 36 and accompanying text (describing concept of confirmation bias). 
14
 This is a prominent theme of Graham Allison’s formative study of foreign policy in the context 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  See generally, GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING 
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971).  Numerous studies examine how military organizations and intelli-
gence agencies adhere to specific policies despite the accumulation of evidence that belies the premises 
of such policies.  See e.g., RONALD H. SPECTOR, EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN – THE AMERICAN WAR WITH 
JAPAN (1985) (describing how U.S. Navy offices responsible for naval torpedoes ignored operational 
evidence that revealed serious design flaws); ERNEST R. MAY, STRANGE VICTORY – HITLER’S
4
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We aim to fill what we see as a gap in the BE literature by directly ap-
plying BE concepts to understand the behavior of government regulators.  
Our experience working for the FTC and dealing with other regulators in 
the United States and overseas has shown us the considerable value in ap-
plying BE concepts to explain past regulatory decisions and to anticipate 
future regulatory actions.15  One of us saw first-hand how a path dependent 
commitment to specific policies caused the FTC to persist in prosecuting 
cases whose conceptual foundations had significantly eroded in light of new 
developments in economic analysis.16  We also have noticed the strong 
temptation for public officials to engage in hyperbolic discounting—to take 
measures that facilitate immediate opportunities for claiming credit while 
disregarding the long-term costs to the agency and to social welfare.17
In this Article, we posit a simple model of a regulator who serves as an 
agent to a political overseer.  The regulator chooses a policy that balances 
her desire to pursue what she believes is the optimal long-run policy against 
the rewards that she receives from the political overseer for taking actions 
that increase the overseer’s odds of reelection.  These objectives may coin-
cide, but they more likely conflict as we assume that the political overseer 
will have a relative preference for policies that maximize outputs or other-
wise convey the appearance of action.  We use this framework to explore 
the effects of bounded rationality on policymaking, with particular empha-
sis on competition policy. 
We find that flawed heuristics (e.g., availability, representativeness, 
optimism, and hindsight) and myopia are likely to lead regulators to adopt 
policies closer to those preferred by political overseers than they otherwise 
would.  The effect of status quo and confirmation biases is less clear, and 
depends on initial policy positions, the order and veracity of information 
CONQUEST OF FRANCE (2000) (discussing how French military authorities in 1940 brushed aside proof 
that German army units were mobilizing for the invasion of France). 
15
 Kovacic served at the FTC as a staff attorney from 1979 to 1983, as general counsel from 2001 
to 2004, as a commissioner from 2006 to 2011, and as the agency’s chairman from March 2008 to 
March 2009.  Cooper was the deputy director with the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning from 2006 to 
2008 and was its acting director from January 2009 to May 2009.  Cooper also served as an advisor to 
Kovacic from 2009 to 2011. 
16
 See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement 
Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 457-60 (2003) (discussing FTC programs in the 1970s to challenge 
single-firm exclusionary conduct and shared monopolization). 
17
 Commentators and journalists often evaluate the effectiveness of antitrust agencies according to 
the number of cases they prosecute rather than by the economic outcomes their programs have yielded.  
See, e.g., GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, RATING ENFORCEMENT: THE ANNUAL RANKING OF THE 
WORLD’S LEADING COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 2-3 (2012) (emphasizing statistics on the prosecution 
of cases as the metric to evaluate the performance of competition authorities).  This can impart a bias to 
initiate cases without adequate regard for their longer term consequences.  This tendency is described in 
William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 903, 918-23 (2009); William E. Kovacic, Hugh M. Hollman & Patricia Grant, How
Does Your Competition Agency Measure Up?, 7 EUR. COMPETITION J. 25, 27-30 (2011). 
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flows, and the regulator’s priors (or first piece of evidence).  We conjecture, 
however, that confirmation bias may create a weak tendency to adopt polit-
ically expedient policies given that the first piece of evidence a regulator 
views on a matter likely will be a call to action. 
We argue that unlike the case of firms that face competition, the incen-
tive structure for regulators is likely to reward those who adopt politically 
expedient policies, either intentionally, due to a desire to please the political 
overseer, or accidentally, due to bounded rationality.  These incentives are 
likely to lead to a cadre of regulators who focus excessively on outputs ra-
ther than outcomes.  Thus, our analysis suggests that careful thought should 
be given to calls for greater state intervention, especially when those calls 
are directed at firm biases.  We also conjecture that instituting internal, ex-
ternal, or both types of teams to review policy, and focusing rewards on 
outcomes rather than outputs, can help ameliorate regulatory biases.  
The Article proceeds as follows: Section II presents a simple model of 
regulation and explores the implications of bounded rationality in policy 
making.  Section III considers how likely regulators are to suffer biases.  
Section IV suggests ways to design decision making structure to ameliorate 
these biases. 
I. A FRAMEWORK OF REGULATORY ACTION
We begin by assuming that the regulator—the person who ultimately 
must approve a market intervention18—chooses a policy to maximize her 
utility.19  The regulatory receives utility from “doing the right thing,” which 
we assume consists of pursuing policies that, in the regulator’s judgment, 
will maximize long-run consumer welfare.  Being human, however, the 
regulator also receives utility from political rewards that accrue as a result 
of adopting policies that political overseers—e.g., committee chairs, the 
President—prefer.  Political overseers want to maximize their chances of 
reelection, and they employ the carrots, e.g., larger budgets, and sticks, e.g., 
oversight hearings, at their disposal to get regulators to hew to their pre-
ferred policies.  On occasion, these reelection-maximizing strategies may 
coincide with those that maximize consumer welfare.  We assume, howev-
er, that political overseers will favor politically expedient policies that focus 
on the appearance of “action” to solve perceived problems. 
The disconnect between welfare maximizing and politically popular 
policies arises for two principle reasons in our framework.  First, their con-
stituents may suffer from various biases that cause them to demand short-
18
 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 12 at 567-68, distinguish between career bureaucrats and 
agency heads in terms of expertise.  We focus on agency leaders who must approve interventions. 
19
 For a more technical treatment, see James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Eco-
nomics: Implications of Regulatory Behavior, 41 J. REG. ECON. 41 (2012). 
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sighted policies.  As Cass Sunstein has argued, for example, politicians 
exploit their constituents’ availability bias to convince them that problems 
exist and then provide short-run solutions to these non-problems.20  In this 
manner, the political overseers act as transparent middlemen, who convert 
boundedly rational constituents’ preferences into policy demands.  Second, 
as with any agent who produces hard-to-observe outputs for her principal, 
politicians will try to signal worth by maximizing observable action.  One 
way to accomplish this is again to pursue policies that focus on resource use 
and “action”—e.g., increase in law enforcement actions or regulations 
promulgated—rather than on ultimate benefits for consumers.21
To create the impression of action, politically expedient policies typi-
cally focus on output or resource use, rather than outcomes.  Such policies, 
for example, could include investigations of market manipulation, anti-price 
gouging laws, or price controls imposed in response to a surge in gasoline 
prices.22  Each of these policies allows the politician to appear to take action 
to counteract the high gasoline prices.  The politician who embraces such 
measures increases the probability of reelection relative to a politician who 
took no action and tried to explain that retail gasoline prices were the func-
tion of supply and demand on world markets for crude oil and that regulato-
ry measures to lower the price (e.g., a prohibition on price-gouging) likely 
will cause harm. 
The regulator’s optimal policy choice is a weighted average of the one 
she believes best for society’s long-run interests and the one that garners the 
most political support for the political overseer, with the weights being ex-
ogenously determined based on the regulator’s innate preferences for max-
imizing social welfare and receiving political rewards.  Of course, as we 
discuss in detail below, the policy the regulator truly believes to maximize 
long-run welfare may also be flawed due to cognitive biases.  In this man-
ner, departures from the long-run efficiency benchmark may enter policy 
20
 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler explain the creation of Superfund as an appeal to biased voters by 
“availability entrepreneurs.”  Jolls et al., supra note 11, at 1509-10.  A more recent example consistent 
with politicians taking advantage of the “availability bias” includes the recent German decision to aban-
don nuclear power in the wake of the Japanese nuclear crisis.  See Judy Dempsey, Merkel Asks Law-
makers to Back Shift from Nuclear, N. Y. TIMES, June 22, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/world/europe/10iht-germany10.html.  Of course, this assumes that 
politicians are not themselves biased when estimating policies that will get them reelected.  E.g., Stefano 
DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315 (2009) 
(arguing that politicians are likely to be rational and constituents are likely to be biased). 
21
 See, e.g., Anthony Pratt & Richard Zeckhauser, Action Bias and Environmental Decisions, 21 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 45 (2000).  See also Michael Bar-Eli et al., Action Bias Among Elite Soccer 
Goalkeepers: The Case of Penalty Kicks, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOLOGY 606 (2007) (finding evidence that 
although staying still is the optimal strategy for a soccer goalie facing a penalty kick, movement is the 
most observed action). 
22
 The capacity of these measures to induce regulators to act in a politically expedient matter is 
discussed in Timothy J. Muris & Bilal K. Sayyed, The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy, Petroleum, 
and Politics at the Federal Trade Commission, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 902-14 (2012). 
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through two channels: indirectly via political overseers’ preferences, and 
directly through a biased regulator’s preferences. 
A regulator will adopt the optimal policy choice if either she places no 
weight on political rewards or if the politician cannot translate constituency 
support into support (or punishment) for the regulator.  On the other hand, 
the regulator who weighs political advancement heavily or is subject to a 
powerful political overseer will be more likely to choose the politically 
expedient policy.  In what follows, we use this simple framework to exam-
ine how commonly cited biases might affect policy outcomes. 
A. Flawed Heuristics and Myopia 
Regulators, like consumers, are likely to use heuristics—or mental 
shortcuts—to estimate the optimal long-run policy choice.  These shortcuts 
save time but may yield systematic decision making errors.  Experimental 
research has documented the existence of several flawed heuristics, which 
are likely to bias regulators against accounting for long-run considerations 
when forming policy.23
First, the “availability” heuristic leads people to overemphasize recent, 
particularly salient events when estimating the overall prevalence of those 
events.  A person who recently saw a neighbor’s house burn down, for ex-
ample, is likely to overestimate the odds that his house will burn in the fu-
ture.  Second, the “representativeness” heuristic causes people to form un-
duly high estimates of posterior probabilities by ignoring low baseline 
probabilities and small sample sizes.  The canonical example of this bias 
comes from an experiment in which Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
asked consumers whether it was more likely that a hypothetical woman was 
a bank teller or a feminist bank teller.24  The former category contains the 
latter, but most subjects placed a higher probability on the latter category.  
Third, people suffering from hindsight bias tend to overestimate the ex ante
probability of an event occurring, given that it has actually occurred.  For 
example, a jury considering a negligence case may be too likely to find the 
defendant’s actions were unreasonable ex ante knowing that an accident 
resulted.  Finally, optimism bias causes individuals to underestimate their 
own probability of experiencing a bad outcome.   
23
 See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS & ITS 
APPLICATIONS 115 (Peter A. Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas 
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1084 (2000). 
24
 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky 
eds., 1982). 
6
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Apart from flawed estimation strategies for unlikely events, regulators 
also may suffer from myopia, which can arise due to cognitive inabilities to 
process life-cycle costs or self-control problems.  Xavier Gabaix and David 
Laibson model myopic consumers who cannot understand a durable good’s 
full life-cycle cost, and they find that even under competitive conditions, 
firms may lack incentives to educate myopic individuals and will offer low 
up-front pricing and supra-competitive aftermarket prices in equilibrium.25
Rachlinski and Farina posit that myopia works not only in a temporal di-
mension but also across subject matters; when designing policies, experts 
may focus narrowly on their specific areas of responsibilities and ignore 
spillover effects.26
In a similar vein, some have examined the inability of actors to bind 
themselves to take future action that maximizes long-run utility, as viewed 
from the initial period.  Laibson develops a theory of time-inconsistent or 
hyperbolic discounting to explain why consumers consistently contribute 
less to their retirement accounts than a rational actor model would predict.27
Professors DellaVigna and Malmender present a formal model in which 
agents plagued by hyperbolic discounting make multi-period decisions and 
derive an equilibrium in which firms may be able to take advantage of con-
sumers who underestimate their future will power.28  They find support for 
their model in observed contracts and consumer behavior in the credit and 
health club markets. 
Together, myopic regulators who use flawed heuristics are likely to 
make imprecise estimates of the optimal policy choice, which they use to 
form policy.  In what follows, we assume that these biases are likely to lead 
the regulator to favor policies that focus excessively on short-run considera-
tions.  Although we recognize that this assumption risks converting our 
model into a tautology, we argue that this assumption is grounded in reality 
and more plausible than the alternative that biases lead regulators to focus 
more sharply on optimal long-run policies. 
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, for example, argue that the availability bias 
gives rise to the “pollutant of the month syndrome,” which leads regulators 
to pursue overly stringent environmental regulation based on highly publi-
cized events.29  Further, representativeness bias may cause a competition 
authority to ignore the prevalence of a business practice (e.g., exclusive 
dealing) in competitive industries—and the low prior odds that markets are 
uncompetitive—when that authority attempts to judge the probability that 
25
 Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505, 531-32 (2006). 
26
 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 12 at 571-82. 
27
 David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443 (1997). 
28
 Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self Control: Theory and 
Evidence, 119 Q. J. ECON. 353 (2004). 
29
 Jolls et al., supra note 11, at 1518. 
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this practice will reduce a market’s competitiveness.  Similarly, in the con-
text of the quasi-negligence determinations involved in certain consumer 
protection violations, hindsight bias is likely to cause an agency to look 
more skeptically on practices that led to harm ex post.  Finally, optimism 
bias may cause regulators to hold an unduly optimistic view of the likely 
success of a policy choice.  More generally, to the extent that regulators are 
better characterized as “lay” rather than “expert” decisions-makers, 
Rachlinski and Farina’s warning that representativeness, availability bias, 
and loss aversions likely will cause Congress to focus on the wrong prob-
lems and the wrong set of solutions, which is also applicable to regulators. 30
Because the effects of bounded rationality and a taste for political re-
wards work in the same direction, it may difficult, if not impossible, to 
identify these effects separately.31  Even an unbiased regulator has an incen-
tive to choose populist policies due to the political rewards that come from 
instant action, especially with limited time horizons.  Of course, biases will 
exacerbate any pre-existing tendency towards populist policies. 
B. Status Quo Bias32
Various cognitive errors together tend irrationally to wed people to the 
status quo.  First, due to what is known as the “endowment effect,” experi-
mental subjects seem to require more compensation to part with an endow-
ment than they are willing to pay to gain it.33  Korobkin and Ulen observe 
that the willingness-to-accept (WTA)/willingness-to-pay (WTP) gap sug-
gests that people are more averse to losing what they already possess than 
rational choice theory predicts.34  Second, loss aversion suggests that how 
decisions are framed matters because people place a higher negative value 
on expected losses than on expected gains of equivalent value.  Relatedly, 
the omission/commission bias leads subjects to be more concerned with 
errors associated with action than inaction.  Together, these cognitive short-
comings create inertia to maintain a current course of action rather than to 
take new action that would increase expected utility.  Concern about this 
bias has inspired vigorous debate on proper default rules for consumer 
choices involving retirement plans, insurance coverage, and privacy poli-
30
 Rachlinski & Farinia, supra note 12, at 562.  These scholars also contend that specialization 
from committees and learning from incumbency may ameliorate the effects of these biases. 
31
 This result flows directly from our assumption that biases tend to focus regulators on short-
term, rather than long-term, solutions. 
32
 See generally, Robert L. Scharff & Francesco Parisi, The Role of Status Quo Bias and Bayesian 
Learning in the Creation of New Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 26-30 (2006). 
33
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 23, at 1107-08.   
34
 Id.
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cies, and has raised questions about the efficiency of Coasian solutions to 
property rights issues.35
Following this argument, the class of cognitive shortcomings that 
make regulators reluctant to alter the status quo will tend to make policies 
“sticky” around initial policies.  The direction in which the status quo bias 
will steer policy is indeterminate theoretically, and will depend on the ini-
tial policy endowment and the direction of the changes.  From this sticki-
ness emerges a path dependency in policy choice, where policies adopted in 
the past have a lingering impact on future policy adoption. 
C. Confirmation Bias 
A large body of experimental research suggests that individuals tend to 
become irrationally wedded to their early impressions about an initially 
ambiguous situation.36  This bias comes about either because subjects ig-
nore all new evidence once they have made up their minds, or because they 
erroneously interpret evidence contradicting their beliefs as supporting their 
beliefs.  Like the status quo bias described above in Section B, confirmation 
bias can entrench a regulator’s existing policies regardless of changes in the 
state of the art of theory or empirical knowledge that ought to compel indi-
viduals to rethink their positions. 
In regulatory settings, confirmation bias leads to overconfidence in 
one’s estimates of optimal policy.  At the micro level, regulators may mis-
read or ignore evidence that conflicts with the theory of a case or policy 
initiative.  For example, a team challenging a merger as likely to harm 
competition may tend to interpret documents from the merging parties that 
objectively tend to cast the merger in a competitive light as either neutral or 
supportive of their case.  Several experimental studies find that litigants 
tend to interpret ambiguous evidence as supporting their view of the case.37
This leads to the counterintuitive finding that greater information revelation 
can actually reduce the possibility of settlement. 
At the macro level, the regulator may misread evidence to confirm 
priors regarding larger policy choices, such as adopting an interventionist or 
laissez-faire attitude toward certain business practices.  The FTC’s treat-
ment of non-price vertical restraints in the 1960s and 1970s illustrates how 
confirmation bias can make enforcement policy unresponsive to changes in 
35
 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 23, at 1109-11; Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for 
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1211, 1226-30 (2003). 
36
 Several researchers have documented this bias in experimental settings involving litigants.  See, 
e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 
(1995); George Lowenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange and 
Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 37 (2004). 
37
 Jolls, supra note 23.  
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the understanding of economics.  In the 1960s, the litigation programs of 
the DOJ and the FTC succeeded in establishing strict prohibitions against 
non-price vertical restraints.38  Through the mid-1970s, the prosecution of 
non-price vertical restraints remained a core element of FTC enforcement 
practice.39  The Commission’s active pursuit of these matters took place 
despite the emergence of a body of economic literature that relied on trans-
action costs considerations to suggest a more tolerant treatment of vertical 
non-price restrictions.40  Only after the Supreme Court’s decision in Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.41—which overruled Schwinn and held 
that the rule of reason would govern non-price vertical restraints—did the 
FTC rethink its vertical restraints enforcement program.  The exogenous 
shock of a judicial decision in a private antitrust case—not an internal reas-
sessment inspired by the application of the Commission’s economic analy-
sis capability—caused a change in enforcement policy.42
Regulators with incorrect priors cause more harm than their counter-
parts who are irrationally wedded to the correct decision.  For example, 
assume that the correct prior for vertical restraints is a laissez-faire pos-
ture.43  A regulator with strong priors that vertical restraints are anticompeti-
tive is likely to misinterpret evidence to confirm this belief, leading to wel-
fare-reducing interventions.  On the other hand, a regulator with correct 
priors may be too pessimistic about the odds that a given vertical practice is 
anticompetitive, but nonetheless will make the correct policy choice.  Given 
a distribution of policy decisions, at the margin, a regulator with such a bias 
will bring too few vertical cases, but because her bias is toward the correct 
38
 See United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that the per se rule 
of illegality applies to vertical restraints that assign exclusive territories to distributors); FTC v. Brown 
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (applying Section 5 of the FTC Act to condemn an exclusive dealing 
arrangement that yielded a vertical foreclosure of less than one percent).  In this period, Donald Turner, 
the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, said he approached vertical “territorial and customer re-
strictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.”  
Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, in 1966 N.Y. State Bar Association Antitrust Law 
Symposium 1, 1-2 (1966). 
39
 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978) (condemning use of exclusive territories in the 
soft drink bottling industry), remanded for dismissal, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
40
 These developments are summarized in Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, 1 
HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 136 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
41
 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
42
 Some evidence suggests that the DOJ responded more quickly to the changing consensus in the 
economic literature and took steps before the Sylvania decision to allocate fewer resources to prosecut-
ing non-price vertical restraints cases.  During Kauper’s tenure as Assistant Attorney General from 1974 
to 1976, the Antitrust Division believed the per se prohibition of Schwinn “made no economic sense” 
and curtailed its challenges to non-price vertical restraints.  See Thomas E. Kauper, The Justice Depart-
ment and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 99 (1990). 
43
 In a Bayesian framework, this would mean that the ratio of the probability that a given vertical 
restraint harms competition to the probability that it benefits competition (or is benign) is less than one. 
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decision, overconfidence will have a smaller effect on the efficacy of ulti-
mate policy choices. 
If a regulator begins with a truly blank slate, the first piece of infor-
mation she receives about a matter will shape her bias in the interpretation 
of future evidence.  Thus, theoretically, there is no way to identify the di-
rection of the bias.  In practice, however, the first piece of information a 
regulator is likely see is some form of evidence supporting action (e.g., 
initiating an investigation or issuing a proposed rule); agency decision mak-
ers are likely to learn of a policy issue only when staff or a political overse-
er calls for intervention.  For example, an antitrust decision maker often 
learns for the first time of a possible anticompetitive merger or business 
practice when she reads a staff memorandum that seeks compulsory process 
to investigate the matter.  By their nature, these memoranda present a case 
for investigation.  The investigation targets, however, are unlikely to pre-
sent their views to the decision maker until much later in the process.  Simi-
larly, the first piece of evidence can come from political overseers calling 
for an investigation into a practice, again leaving the target no opportunity 
to counter the charges until much later in the process.  If these requests for 
action become the anchoring point from which the regulator interprets sub-
sequent evidence to estimate the optimal policy, this will lead to an inter-
vention bias, even where the regulator places a large weight on long-run 
welfare. 
The possibilities identified above help explain a trend we observed 
during our time at the FTC in the behavior of firms subject to the agency’s 
antitrust or consumer protection authority.  We noticed an increasing ten-
dency of firms to meet individually with members of the Commission and 
provide briefings outside the context of a pending FTC investigation or 
other law enforcement proceeding.  With greater frequency, firms would 
arrange visits to discuss important commercial developments (such as the 
introduction of new products or services) or to provide what amounted to 
tutorials about their operations.  These can be interpreted as efforts to frame 
the thinking of the Commission or to counteract the bias that might be de-
veloping within the agency that would favor intervention.  If a firm waits 
until after formal proceedings are initiated, it may be too late to alter a pro-
intervention perspective.  Our impression from these experiences is that the 
practice of lobbying and government relations involves a heavier emphasis 
on what might be called precautionary de-biasing advocacy before federal 
regulatory authorities.  Again, this is consistent with the intuition that firms 
see such activity as an antidote to possible internal agency biases that press 
in the direction of intervention. 
In practice, we doubt that a regulator begins with a truly blank slate.  
More realistically, regulators come to decisions with priors, or a “mental 
model” of how the world works.  This model likely correlates with political 
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beliefs, education, and experience.44  Like the Bayesian “blank slate” updat-
ing framework, the regulator screens out or discounts information that does 
not conform to her pre-existing worldview due to a desire to achieve policy 
outcomes that conform to her model.  The key difference is that the regula-
tor does not begin as an empty vessel when faced with each policy choice, 
but rather evaluates even the first piece of information with potential bias.  
Thus, an antitrust regulator who views markets as generally self-correcting 
is less likely to find evidence sufficient to support intervention than a coun-
terpart who is skeptical of business practices.  Unlike the “blank slate” 
model, even if the first piece of information is a call for action from staff or 
a political overseer, the skeptical regulator will not process future infor-
mation to confirm the call for action, but rather through his existing frame-
work.  Consequently, the regulator skeptical of the efficacy of intervention 
will require more “pro-intervention” information to arrive at a decision to 
intervene than a regulator operating with a truly blank slate. 
Publicly stated positions also can anchor policy.  Once a regulator 
takes a position on a particular policy, she will want to filter future matters 
in a way that supports her initial wisdom.  These public pronouncements 
will represent the regulator’s true belief of the optimal policy blended with 
the influence of political patrons—for example, promises made during con-
firmation hearings to assure support.  In this way, the policy underlying the 
initial public announcement is not itself biased.  Future policy decisions, 
however, are, to the extent that future estimates of optimal long-run policy 
are the product of confirmation bias anchored on the policy initially an-
nounced.  As with loss aversion, this type of anchoring can lead to path 
dependency in regulatory policy adoption. 
Finally, confirmation bias also can reinforce preferences for short-
sighted decisions that derive from the flawed heuristics and myopia intro-
duced in Section A.  For example, as discussed above, a myopic regulator is 
more likely than a rational regulator to invest sub-optimally in policy de-
velopment.  This decision will form the regulator’s priors, and non-
conforming subsequent evidence will have a minimal effect on changing 
the regulator’s view of the world.  In this manner, myopia and confirmation 
bias can reinforce one another.  For a boundedly rational regulator affected 
by confirmation bias, the decision to initiate litigation or rulemaking due to 
insufficient consideration of long term costs and benefits will shape the 
interpretation of subsequent information in a manner that tends to cast the 
decision in a favorable light. 
44
 Yoram Wind & Colin Crook, From Mental Models to Transformation: Overcoming Inhibitors 
to Change, ROTMAN MAG., Spring 2009. 
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II. WILL REGULATORS SUFFER FROM BIASES IN THE LONG RUN?
A threshold question, which we have yet to address, is to what extent 
are regulators actually likely to suffer from these biases?  On one hand, if 
regulatory institutions operate like firms, there are reasons to believe that 
regulators mostly may escape the cognitive problems that plague consumer 
decision making.  The consensus within BE scholarship, for example, ap-
pears to be that firms are unlikely to make systematically biased decisions 
in the long run.  DellaVigna explains how consumers and firms differ: 
Experience is the key difference.  Unlike individual consumers, firms can specialize, hire 
consultants, and obtain feedback from large data sets and capital markets. . . .  Compared to 
consumers, therefore, firms are less likely to be affected by biases (except for principal-agent 
problems), and we expect them to be close to profit maximization.45
Recent evidence also suggests that consumers who initially display bi-
ases can learn to overcome them with marketplace experience.46  Is it rea-
sonable to assume that because regulators often are “experts” and repeated-
ly face similar problems they will be able to make unbiased policy deci-
sions?  Even if agency heads who make decisions are political appointees 
and not true field experts, agency career staff can provide expertise and 
experience.47
The analogy between firms and regulatory institutions extends only so 
far; the feedback mechanism that facilitates learning differs significantly 
between firms and regulators.  Unlike the marketplace, which quickly gives 
firms feedback in the form of prices, profits, and output, the link between 
policy decisions and outcomes is more attenuated.  For example, accurate 
measurement of a policy’s welfare effects is difficult and somewhat rare.  
Even when effects are determined, the lag from policy choice to policy exe-
cution can be long; cases and rulemaking can take several years from their 
initiation through final appeals in the courts.  As the link between a decision 
and feedback weakens, the ability to learn diminishes. 
Another consideration is that the cost to the regulator of policy mis-
takes is low compared to those of a firm.  Generally speaking, a company 
that systematically errs is more likely to exit than a regulatory body that 
continually adopts welfare-reducing policies.  The head of such an agency 
may continue to enjoy rewards as long as she increases outputs on margins 
that political overseers care about—action that maximizes the probability of 
45
 DellaVigna, supra note 20, at 361. 
46
 John List finds evidence that the endowment effect fades as agents become more experienced 
traders.  John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 
ECONOMETRICA 615 (2004); John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 
Q. J. OF ECON. 41 (2003). 
47
 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 12, at 579. 
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reelection.  When competition among regulatory bodies occurs, it is likely 
to assume that they compete on the form of activities (e.g., protection of 
jurisdictional boundaries, the output of observable policy interventions) that 
have no necessary correlation with positive welfare outcomes. 
The weak connection between welfare and regulatory rewards can 
yield a cadre of regulators who are biased toward short-run politically ex-
pedient policies.  The regulator with a weak preference for maximizing 
long-term social welfare will tend to enjoy policy rewards.  The regulator 
with a strong preference for maximizing long-term social welfare but who 
suffers from myopia or confirmation bias, however, may accidently receive 
more support than an unbiased regulator with a similar taste for long-run 
welfare maximization.  A biased regulator who sees herself as independent 
from political control, for example, may nonetheless bring a large number 
of headline-grabbing, but welfare-reducing, cases.  Although viewed as 
welfare-maximizing policy by the regulator, an objective observer would 
see these as politically expedient policies, which please the political overse-
er.  Thus, regulators with short-term biases—both due to high political 
weighting and bias—are likely to be over represented in the population of 
regulators. 
In sum, it appears that the regulatory feedback structure makes it un-
likely that regulators will learn to overcome their biases.  This distinction 
between regulatory and market feedback cannot be overstated: marketplace 
performance is a direct measurement of consumer benefit from actions, 
whereas regulatory outputs have no necessary relationship to consumer 
welfare.  Even if rewards were tied more closely with outcomes, the time 
lags and measurement problems discussed above make it difficult to link 
clear regulatory failures to specific regulators, especially given their short 
tenures. 
These observations warrant caution in assuming the efficacy of inter-
vention to correct perceived firm biases.  For example, Professors Stucke 
and Tor argue that because firms may overestimate their chances of suc-
cessful entry into a market, antitrust authorities should place less confi-
dence on entry as a means to ameliorate potential anticompetitive effects.48
Tor and Rinner suggest that the rule of reason be applied more stringently 
to minimum resale price maintenance agreements to account for the possi-
bility that biases lead firms to overestimate the profit-reducing effects of 
price competition.49  These normative prescriptions for enhanced interven-
tion implicitly assume that the decisions of regulators to intervene will not 
themselves stem from biases.  When these biases guide policy choices, it is 
not evident that regulators will be able to intervene successfully to “correct” 
firms’ entry and vertical contracting decisions.  Comparing the limitations 
48
 Stucke, supra note 9; Tor, supra note 9. 
49
 Tor & Rinner, supra note 9. 
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of private and public decision making, market feedback is more likely to be 
effective in correcting biases than regulatory feedback. 
The role of markets in correcting firm biases also suggests an im-
portant role for antitrust enforcement.  Although regulatory biases have the 
potential to exacerbate already-existing tendencies for antitrust authorities 
to intervene in markets too often, a competitive market is a necessary con-
dition for firms to correct their biases.  If firms are to learn from the market, 
mistakes need to be costly.  A rational firm generally will earn higher prof-
its than a biased firm, conditional on the competitiveness of the market in 
which it operates.50  However, the feedback from poor decisions—and 
hence the incentive to correct biases—is stronger for a biased firm operat-
ing in a competitive market than one facing little competition.  In this man-
ner, sound competition enforcement directly ameliorates welfare losses 
from the illegal exercise of market power and indirectly may improve mar-
ket performance in the spirit of Hayek by enhancing the information flows 
that firms need to identify and correct biases. 
How often biases survive is a function of the costs of being wrong.  
When it is difficult to detect wrong decisions and the costs of being wrong 
are small, there is little incentive to invest in correcting biases.  In the next 
section, we discuss how improved accountability—linking outcomes to 
rewards—can help ameliorate this problem. 
III. POSSIBLE CORRECTING MECHANISMS
As shown in Section II, not all biases predict the same policy drift; 
some tend to temper others.  For example, availability, representativeness, 
optimism, and myopia probably push regulators to adopt more politically 
expedient policies.  Although we posit that information coming to regula-
tors is likely to take the form of calls for intervention, the effect of confir-
mation bias is uncertain, depending on the regulators’ priors, and the order 
and relative veracity of information flows.  Finally, the status quo bias can 
tend to stabilize policies around a focal point, but there is no a priori means 
to determine whether a policy is stuck closer to a long-run optimal policy or 
to a politically expedient one. 
For example, imagine a regulator who suffers from all the biases we 
have cataloged and inherits an agency with a relatively interventionist poli-
cy stance.  Assume also that her priors are weighted toward long-run wel-
fare maximizing policies.  The biases of availability, representativeness, 
myopia, and overconfidence could pull the regulator’s estimate of the opti-
mal policy closer to the political overseers’ preferred position.  Given her 
50
 Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Terms: A Primer, 6 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3 (2010) (describing instances where “irrational” firms may earn higher 
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priors, however, the regulator would tend to overly discount calls from staff 
and political overseers calling for intervention, and to misinterpret evidence 
that supports intervention as evidence in favor of non-intervention.  At the 
same time, because the status quo is assumed to be one of relative interven-
tion, she may hesitate to disturb the agency’s current posture. 
The point is that we cannot predict how a boundedly rational regulator 
suffering from a collection of biases will act.  We can say that her actions 
will have no systematic correlation with optimal long-run policy; if they 
happen to mesh, it is due only to chance.  Accordingly, if there is value to 
predictable policy, the elimination of regulatory bias is desirable.  This sec-
tion explores the potential of two strategies for ameliorating the harm asso-
ciated with these biases: insulation and de-biasing. 
A. Insulation 
Insulation involves a “choice architect” eliminating (or making more 
difficult to choose) poor alternatives (e.g., smoking, fatty foods, payday 
borrowing, etc.) from the choice set, thereby protecting the biased decision 
maker from bad decisions.  Much BE literature advocates this type of pa-
ternalistic solution in the context of flawed consumer decision making.  It is 
unclear how insulation would work to eliminate regulatory bias. 
In practice, legislatures and courts limit regulatory discretion.  For ex-
ample, legislation directing agency action (e.g., rulemaking or law en-
forcement) defines the scope—sometimes narrowly—of the agency’s au-
thority to act.  Some have written on the need for legislatures to implement 
ex ante statutory constraints to curb ex post opportunism by regulators.51
Courts also police agencies to assure fealty to congressional intent, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, and constitutional strictures.  In theory, legisla-
tures and courts could use the same tools to eliminate poor choices from the 
regulator’s set.  To the extent that insulation strategies bind regulators to 
certain future actions to maximize welfare, they avoid suffering the “con-
sumer sovereignty” issues that plague choice architecture directed at myop-
ic consumers. 
To employ these ex ante and ex post restraints to insulate agencies 
from poor regulatory choices, one must establish objectively “correct” 
51
 Two scholars note: 
Since it is well known that regulatory authorities cannot be forced into welfare-maximising 
behavior, the question arises whether opportunistic behaviour can be excluded by the design 
and implementation of adequate hostages. . . .  Regulatory authorities as part of the bureau-
cracy cannot be fined for inadequate behavior.  As a consequence, it is only by means of a 
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choices.  To do so requires an unbiased choice architect.  For the reasons 
detailed in Section II, there is no reason to believe that legislatures could 
systematically identify and limit poor choices from the regulator’s set.  In-
stead, they are likely to encourage them.  The seriatim nature of judicial 
decision making, focused on particular parties and unique facts, is likely to 
diminish a court’s ability to escape cognitive bias through learning, particu-
larly when dealing with complex regulations.52  Because courts stake out 
positions in their published decisions, they may be especially susceptible to 
confirmation bias anchored on their previous rulings. 
Even if one could find an unbiased architect, the informational de-
mands to establish the optimal future regulatory choice set may be insur-
mountable.  Deciding to block or restrict certain regulatory paths is a far 
more complex task than placing the fruit in front of the fries in the cafeteria.  
Any insulation strategy involving ex post review by courts almost neces-
sarily would engage judges in ranking regulatory choices based on norma-
tive criteria.  This contradicts established legal doctrines that direct courts 
to focus on agency adherence to procedural mandates, as well as constitu-
tional and legislative restraints, rather than assess the wisdom of regulatory 
policy choices.53
B. De-biasing 
A second way to limit the impact of regulatory bias is to take steps to 
enable boundedly rational agents to make decisions as rational agents.  De-
biasing can include the complete elimination of biases or measures that lead 
naive regulators—i.e., those who are unaware of their biases—to account 
for their biases when making choices.  For example, Jolls notes that in some 
experiments, showing jurors pictures of Tiger Woods before deliberation 
may act to eliminate unconscious racial bias.54  Similarly, taking advantage 
of the availability heuristic by publicizing the most severe adverse effects 
associated with smoking may help counteract the over-optimism bias in 
smoking decisions.  Below, we examine two de-biasing strategies in the 
regulatory context: routine adversarial review of policies, and making regu-
lators more accountable for outcomes. 
52
 Farina & Rachlinski, supra note 12, at 578. 
53
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1. Adversarial Review  
As explained above, regulatory institutions are unlikely to feature 
competition that corrects biases.  One way to generate needed feedback is 
to establish an internal adversarial process; a serious internal critique of 
regulatory proposals can help punish irrational policy choices before they 
take effect, to some extent replicating the negative feedback the market-
place provides firms that act irrationally.  Professors Jolls and Sunstein dis-
cuss research suggesting that outside directors on corporate boards help to 
ameliorate overly optimistic inside directors.55  Some studies show that liti-
gants who are forced to consider a case from their adversaries’ perspectives 
are less likely to suffer from undue optimism or confirmation bias.56
An agency could implement this “B-Team” approach by assigning 
staff members to act as defense counsel in a proposed case.  This approach 
would provide an alternative narrative to explain documentary and statisti-
cal evidence.  The adversary team may be biased as well, but anchoring 
would be in the opposite direction, forcing the two biases to compete.  The 
B-Team could provide internal memoranda mustering the best arguments 
against the case contemporaneously with the staff’s recommendation.  In 
some instances, the two internal teams could take part in a mock trial.  A 
complementary method, used by the FTC, is to have the Bureau of Eco-
nomics provide a recommendation separate from the attorney case han-
dlers.57  The welfare-centered approach of economics provides a distinct 
perspective from those of attorneys who have investigated a case or re-
searched a proposed rule often from a legal perspective.  This would ex-
plain why a growing number of competition agencies have given econo-
mists greater autonomy to make recommendations directly to top agency 
leadership.  By contrast, making economists subordinate to the lawyers in 
charge of cases or rulemaking mutes the de-biasing effect. 
Ex ante review by external parties also may help to counteract biases 
in regulatory decision making.  The Office of Management and Budget 
must approve proposed rules and certain research projects before an agency 
can proceed, although it does not apply to cases.58 Ex ante peer review by a 
panel of experts, as now used in scientific policy making, could also be 
imported to the competition policy arena.  Some statutes that require agency 
55
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reports compel the agencies to consult with various other regulatory entities 
that are likely to have expertise in the subject area.59
In rulemaking, ex post review by courts may force agencies to engage 
in this type of de-biasing.  Established legal doctrines require agencies to 
open their decision making process to public participation, which acts to 
solicit multiple opposing viewpoints for most proposed regulations.  Agen-
cies also must show that they considered the record established during the 
rulemaking and articulate a plausible nexus between the rule ultimately 
adopted and the record evidence.60  As Rachlinski and Farina explain, 
“[h]aving to assess the force of criticisms coming from a variety of perspec-
tives, and craft a persuasive response to those criticisms that are (or may be 
viewed by a reviewing court as) significant, helps an agency to step outside 
of the decision making process.”61  This ex post review, however, does not 
apply to internal decisions to engage in law enforcement or less formal pol-
icy initiatives. 
Altering the decision making structure also may ameliorate biases.  
Some evidence involving corporate governance suggests that multimember 
boards with heterogeneous priors will act more rationally than a unitary 
decision maker. 62  Public agencies with bipartisan boards (e.g., the FTC) 
may be less susceptible to biases than executive branch agencies with one 
decision maker. 
2. Greater Accountability: Focus on Outcomes Rather Than Outputs 
The moral hazard that exists with respect to regulatory decision mak-
ing serves to maintain biases.  Creating an institutional framework that 
makes regulators more accountable for the welfare effects of their policies 
may help provide the feedback needed to correct or ameliorate biases.63  As 
noted earlier, creating this framework is easier said than done.  Measuring 
the welfare effects of a policy is a daunting task.  Nonetheless, if agencies 
devoted additional resources to perform ex post evaluations of interven-
tions, with budgets and other rewards (e.g., fewer hearings, good publicity) 
tied more closely to these results rather than outputs, regulators might inter-
nalize more of the costs associated with their biases rather than merely im-
posing them upon consumers.  As a complement to this policy, longer ten-
59
 See, e.g., Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act § 703, 39 U.S.C. § 3633 (requiring the 
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ures for regulators would make it difficult for them to obfuscate their con-
nection with a failed policy. 
A focus on outcomes also can act as a commitment device to mitigate 
the effects of myopia.  Consider a regulator who in period one has a choice 
between announcing a case and initiating a rulemaking prematurely.  The 
publicity surrounding the announcement and the impression that “some-
thing is being done” garners the regulator immediate political benefits.  
Because action is taken prematurely, however, it will provide diminished 
benefits to consumers in period two.  Alternatively, if the regulator waits 
until period two to make a decision on the policy—thus allowing more time 
for research, discovery, etc.—the decision will create greater consumer 
benefits in period two.64  Thus, if the regulator chooses to consume greater 
political benefits in period one, she will cause consumers to suffer harm in 
period two.  We assume immediate action is more likely to garner political 
support. 
As suggested by DellaVigna and Malmendier, suppose that the regula-
tor has a time-inconsistent, quasi-hyperbolic discount rate.65  Hyperbolic 
discounting can lead to time-inconsistent decisions in which the regulator at 
time zero does not want to see the case commence in period one, but 
changes her mind when period one arrives because the immediate benefits 
are now more attractive due to a more heavily discounted period two cost. 
If the regulator were to have a time-consistent discount rate, the ap-
propriate rule for commencing action in period one would be the same as 
the rule for the hyperbolic-discounting regulator at time zero.  As expected, 
with or without hyperbolic discounting, probability of bringing the case 
prematurely is a positive function of the political benefit from current ac-
tion and the relative weight that the regulator places on political rewards 
versus social welfare.  Hyperbolic discounting, however, implies both a 
greater propensity for time inconsistency as well as increased incentives to 
commence the case prematurely relative to an unbiased regulator. 
A framework that ties rewards to outcomes, rather than outputs, would 
act to provide internal disutility and would reduce future rewards.  In theo-
ry, the regulator would act as if she were completely de-biased.  In this 
manner, a focus on outcomes in period two can help make the period zero 
regulator credibly commit to bringing a case only when long term social 
gains are maximized.  Of course, this de-biasing strategy does not lead to 
optimal long-run policies—as long as the regulator values political rewards, 
she will always have some incentives to take premature action.  Only strat-
egies that also reduce political influence or increase tastes for long-run wel-
fare can reduce the public choice influence on policy making. 
64
 This decision may include taking no action. 
65
 DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 28, at 318. 
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CONCLUSION
Much work in the nascent field of behavioral antitrust prescribes ex-
panded use of competition law to correct consumer harm that arises from 
biased firm behavior.  If regulators, who are human after all, suffer from the 
same biases, our analysis suggests a greater skepticism of these calls for 
increased intervention.  Although regulators are likely to have an edge over 
consumers in terms of experience and expertise, it is not clear that they will 
be able to intervene in ways that systematically improve welfare.  The 
model we present shows that political pressure will cause rational regulators 
to choose policies that are not optimal from a consumer standpoint, and that 
in a large number of circumstances regulatory bias will exacerbate this ten-
dency. 
We also suggest special caution when attempting to correct firm be-
havior, for regulatory bias appears likely more durable than firm bias be-
cause the market provides a much stronger feedback mechanism than exists 
in the regulatory environment.  To the extent that we can de-bias regula-
tors—either through a greater use of internal and external adversarial re-
view or by making a closer nexus between outcomes and rewards—they 
will become more effective at welfare-enhancing interventions. 
